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ABSTRACT
Supply-side tax and spending policies have intensified poverty,
unemployment and inequality, especially for women, minorities
and organized labor. At the same time Reaganomics is shrinking
and weakening the welfare state. To better understand and resist
this conservative assault it is necessary to demystify the "eco-
nomics" and "politics" of supply-side doctrine. This paper (a)
defines the basic assumptions of supply-side economics; (b) iden-
tifies some of its problems and contradictions; (c) discusses
its impact on the welfare state; and (d) analyzes it as part of
a broader plan for coping with the current economic crisis. It
argues that the supply-side tax cut not only lowers government
revenues, but provides a justification for cutting domestic pro-
grams. Domestic cutbacks, in turn, are achieved by new laws that
change program rules and regulations, transfer federal social
welfare responsibility to the states, that weaken the political
support for the programs themselves. This legislated conserva-
tive legacy will be more difficult to reverse than if the cuts
were achieved by just lowering appropriations. As a domestic
strategy, Reaganomics is part of a broader response to the cur-
rent economic crisis that involves redirecting larger amounts of
capital into the private sector and weakening the political
strength of women, minorities and organized labor whose demands
for an adequate standard of living have become to costly for
business and government to absorb.
Supply-side economics is a disaster for the social services. The fiscal 1982
budget based on supply-side tax, spending and regulatory policies is intensifying
poverty, unemployment and inequality, especially for women, minorities and the
working poor. It reduces the availability and accessibility of increasingly
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necessary social services and benefits, and creates job insecurity if not unemploy-
ment among social service workers who meanwhile are "battered" by rising caseloads
and troublesome decisions about who can and cannot be served (Lewis, 1980).
To cope with and resist the devastating effects of this conservative economic
doctrine, we must first understand it. This paper hopes to demystify the "eco-
nomics" and "politics" of supply-side economics by (a) defining its assumptions,
(b) identifying some of its problems and contradictions, (c) discussing its im-
pact on the welfare state, and (d) analyzing it as part of the Administration's
response to the current economic crisis.
WHAT IS SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS?
Supply-side economics is part of a broad attempt to deal with the economic
crisis facing the United States since the mid-1970's. The attempt is not a new
one. Like Nixon, Ford and Carter before him, Reagan is trying to stimulate in-
vestment and production while reducing unemployment and inflation. The failure
of his predecessors to revive the sagging economy merely gave Reagan the oppor-
tunity to reject Keynesian economic policies on behalf of conservative economics
and ideology known today as supply-side economics or Reaganomics.
But neither is supply-side economics new. It is a modern day version of a
laissez-faire doctrine known as Say's Law, named for Jean Baptiste Say (1767-
1832), a French follower and popularizer of the work of Adam Smith. In brief,
Say's Law says that "supply creates its own demand" (Editors, 1981). That is,
in an unrestricted market, production (supply) can generate enough income (demand)
which when spent is just enough to clear the market of all goods and services pro-
duced. Moreover, unemployment and idle capacity, can automatically be eliminated
by an increase in production. Therefore policy aimed at stimulating the economy
need only be concerned with increasing production (or removing barriers to such
an increase). Everything else, including the demand for the resulting output will
take care of itself. Most economists accepted this doctrine until the 1930's when
it was discredited by the Great Depression and the work of British economist,
John Maynard Keynes.
Keynesian economics became the new orthodoxy after World War II. In contrast
to Say's emphasis on stimulating production, Keynes focused on the problem of in-
sufficient demand. Arguing that demand tends to fall short of potential output or
supply and that business produces only as much as it can sell, Keynes concluded
that a market economy could not sustain itself. Rather it was prone to periodic
crises of low production and high unemployment, such as the Depression of the 1930's.
To prevent this, Keynes recommended that government use its tax and spending powers
to stimulate demand incurring a deficit, if necessary. Indeed Keynes recommended
deficit spending as a good way to bolster demand. Once the economy reached the
point of full employment, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies could be used
to control inflation.
Contemporary supply-siders such as Jack Kemp, Norman Ture, P. Craig Roberts,
Arthur Laffer among others, reject "demand-side" theory. They favor Say's Law as
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the best route out of the current economic crisis. The heart of their supply-side
economics, the tax cut, is viewed as the critical stimulus to production (Roberts,
1981; Davenport, 1978). By lowering production costs and raising after-tax income,
the tax cut is expected to encourage people to work more (overtime, moonlight, em-
ployment of additional family members); to save more (due to higher after-tax
wages) and to invest more (due to higher after-tax income and corporate profits).
The supply-siders also maintain that reduced taxes need not increase the def-
ficit nor require budget cuts. This is the message of the Laffer curve, a mathema-
tical model of tax revenues which indicates that lowered tax rates will revitalize
production and employment such that tax revenues will remain constant or even in-
crease (Arenson, 1981a). In turn, the demand for unemployment insurance, food
stamps and AFDC will fall permitting the budget to be balanced without massive
budget cuts.
Finally supply-siders promise to control inflation by increasing supply with-
out stimulating excessive demand. Once investments and greater productivity lower
unit costs of production prices will fall. Any increase in demand caused by high-
er after-tax income will be less than the increased supply of goods and services
thereby easing inflationary pressures.
Unlike Keynesians, supply-siders see high taxes and government regulations as
part of the problem, not part of the solution. As barriers that raise the costs
of goods, labor and capital and stymie production, government regulations must be
removed.
Problems and Contradictions
Supply-side economics does not seem to be working. Among other things, its
failure has been attributed to weak theoretical assumptions; a lack of correspondence
with economic realities; and the effect of competing economic policy recommendations
within Administration circles.
Supply-side theory predicts that lower taxes will encourage more work, saving
and investment. But standard economic theory and the behavior of consumers and
business indicate otherwise. Economic theory teaches that lower tax rates can
make people work more (if they want a greater income) or less (since the same amount
of money can be earned in less time or by fewer people) (Samuelson, 1970). Studies
also show that changes in taxes cause little or no change in the hours people work,
since institutional requirements more than personal preferences determine the length
of the workday orworkweek(Tabb, 1981). Likewise, the portion of income saved
overtime has remained fairly steady despite tax fluctuations (Arenson, 1981a).
Businessmen and economists also question the supply-side prediction that low-
ered corporate taxes will stimulate greater business investment. The demand for a
company's product and/or anticipated profits, not just lowered production costs sig-
nificantly shape business investment decisions (Arenson, 1981b; Tabb, 1981). As
the chief economist at Chase Econometrics observed, although ."investment incentives
do stimulate investment," they will take many years to improve productivity," and
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,won't slow inflation quickly" (Arenson, 1981b). At the margin, says William Tabb,
Professor of Economics at Queens College, "some productive investment may be forth-
coming, but very little, and at an exceedingly high cost in lost tax revenues"
(Tabb, 1981).
Supply-side failures also stem from the competition within administration
circle between the supply-siders and the monetarists.1 Monetarists, the tradi-
tional fiscal conservatives, worry most about inflation and budget deficits. They
favor restrictive fiscal and monetary policies designed to lower demand and
squeeze inflation out of the economy. These deflationary policies conflict with
the stimulative push of supply-side tax cuts and large military outlays causing
Administration policies to contradict or cancel each other out.
Even the Administration had to acknowledge that a commitment to restrictive
monetary policy imposed limits on its goals for economic growth (Fuebringer, 1981).
More dramatically, plans to cut taxes and expand military budgets forced the Admin-
istration to raise its deficit estimates from a low of $42.5 billion to over $100
billion. These figures strain the Laffer-curve promise that tax cuts will revital-
ize the economy and permit the budget to be balanced. So does the deep recession
(which many argue is due to the Administration's own restrictive monetary policy),
record post-war unemployment rates and falsification of data used by the Adminis-
tration, which created overly optimistic initial economic recovery forecasts
(Greider, 1981).
As the impact of supply-side tax cuts, increased military spending and the
deregulation of oil, gas and other prices ripples through the economy, prices will
rise, undermining the original supply-side promise to control inflation (Alperovitz
and Faux, 1981; Dollars and Sense, 1981). Although it involved sweeping cuts of
property, not income taxes, California's Proposition 13 may be viewed as a pre-
test of the supply-side tax cut. Neither a production boom, nor lower inflation rates
resulted (Dollars and Sense, 1981).
Despite its inconsistencies and weaknesses, Reaganomics has already damaged
the welfare state. Although Reagan's 1983 budget is currently stalled in Congress,
the conservative legacy Reagan plans for the welfare state needs to be examined.
IMPLICATIONS OF REAGANOMICS FOR THE WELFARE STATE
Both the supply-side tax cuts and the social spending reductions involve more
than lowered appropriations. Rather structural changes in the tax code and in the
social welfare system are being legislated to achieve the twin conservative goals of
a smaller federal government and a weaker welfare state. These changes, described
next, may be difficult to reverse.
1. The monetarists include old guard Republicans such as Secretary of Treasury,
Donald T. Regan; Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Paul Volker; and conservative
economists such as Alan Greenspan, Arthur Burns, Herbert Stein and Milton
Friedman.
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Tax Cut
The Congressional Budget Office observed that the 1982 tax cut, "departed
from all other post World War II legislation in its broad scope and the magnitude
of its revenue effect" (CBO, 1982a). As a result, the federal government will
have less money to spend. Between 1982-1987 government revenues are expected to
increase at an annual rate of 6.9%, down from 13.6% for the previous five years.
The share of the GNP claimed by the federal government through the tax system will
drop steadily from 20.6% in 1982 to 17.7% in 1987, the smallest share since 1965
%CBO, 1982a). In the words of Treasury Secretary Regan, the tax cuts promise "to
change the concept of how fiscal matters will be handled in Washington in decades
ahead" (Newsweek, 1981b). They also promise to restructure the tax system: They
contribute to an upward redistribution of income, make the tax system more re-
gressive and promise to lower government revenues for many years to come.
On the grounds that they are more likely to save and invest, the tax cuts in-
tentionally favor wealthy individuals and large corporations (Quinn, 1981; Wicker,
1982). Although 95% of U.S. families earn less than $50,000 a year, the new fed-
eral tax code cuts taxes of families making over $60,000 most sharply (Quinn, 1981).
In 1982 the tax cut will be worth $120 to families earning $10,000 or less, but
$15,000 for those earning $80,000 or more (CBO, 1982b; Pear 1982a). The new law
reduces the maximum tax on unearned income, from 70% to 50% in 1982, eliminates
inheritance taxes on estates worth $600,000 or less (99.6% of all estates) by 1987
(Fessler, 1981) and lowers corporate income taxes (Arenson, 1981b).
These and other tax code changes make the entire tax system more regressive.
Between 1981 and 1987 the proportion of federal revenues raised by the more pro-
gressive personal income tax will fall from 47.1% to 44.9%; the corporate share
will drop to 8.1%, down from 17% in 1970 and 24% in 1960 (Arenson, 1981b). Mean-
while, federal revenues raised from the regressive Social Security payroll tax will
rise from 30.9% to 38.4% (CBO, 1982a). Ironically these tax changes which reduce
tax burden of the wealthy most of all are justified by the recent middle-class tax
revolts.
Finally, the tax cuts may be difficult to reverse since most politicians fear
tax increases will lose them support at the polls. Lowered revenues mean less
money to spend and havebeen a major justification for shrinking "big government"
especially the unpopular welfare state.
Social Spending Cuts
Social spending cuts historically favored by conservatives as the best way to
balance the budget are not strictly speaking part of supply-side theory as they do
not directly stimulate production (Arenson, 1981a). But by reducing government
revenues and increasing the deficit, the supply-side tax cut provides a powerful
rationale for domestic budget cuts. As Walter Heller, former Kennedy advisor re-
cently said, "for the present and indefinite future," lowered revenues means that
"government's shelves are going to be bare of funds for new programs...and there's
going to be relentless pressure for more and more spending cuts" (Newsweek, 1981b).
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Less government spending, the argument goes, will lower inflation, shrink
the federal deficit, and reduce the need for federal borrowing to finance it. Less
government borrowing it is hoped will bring interest rates down, making more and
cheaper money available for investment by private corporations.
In brief, lowered social spending is seen as essential to cut costs and to limit
the federal government as a competitor with private enterprise for investment capi-
tal, believed to be scarce. In the eyes of Wall Street and many politicians, domes-
tic cuts are needed to make room for more private economic activity (Cowan, 1982).
Such reasoning legitimized massive domestic budget cuts in fiscal 1982 and
calls for even more in 1983. As early as October 1981, Stockman explained to the
House Budget Committee that "twenty years of history aren't going to be corrected
in twenty weeks. We're going to have to go at it again and again and again, until
we establish fiscal sanity in this country" (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981b).
Like the tax cuts, domestic budget cuts involved more than reduced funding.
They include a restructuring social welfare programs, if not the welfare state it-
self. Indeed, some dub Reaganomics as the end of the New Deal. Nobel Prize winner
James Tobin (1981) calls Reaganomics "a conservative counter-revolution in the
theory, ideology and practice of economic policy" and Treasury Secretary Regan says
it is a "conservative revolution" against fifty years of welfare statesmanship"
(Newsweek, 1981c). David Stockman, spelled out the specifics of the "revolution"
in a March 1981 television interview when he stated:
The idea that's been established over the
last ten years that almost every service
that anyone might need in life ought to
be provided and financed by the government
as a matter of rights is wrong. We reject
that. We reject that notion (Rosenbaum,
1981a).
The Administration's domestic cutback strategies include (a) revising social
welfare program rules and regulations, (b) transferring responsibility for social
welfare from the federal government to the states, and (c) weakening resistance
to such changes by reducing the economic security and reversing political gains
fought for and won by women, minorities and labor since the 1930's. If successful,
these strategies not only promise to shrink the social welfare system and make it
more vulnerable to future cuts, but like the tax cuts they will be difficult to
reverse.
Social Welfare Program Revisions. Cuts in social welfare programs involve
more than spending reductions because the Administration wants to restructure the
social welfare system and Congress cannot limit the costs of entitlement programs
through the annual appropriation process. By law, everyone who is eligible for
entitlement benefits is legally "entitled" to them, so the government must provide
funds sufficient to cover the costs. The large middle class constituencies of many
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of these so-called "uncontrollable" expenditures, makes them even more difficult
for politicians to cut (Donnelly, 1982a). Only by restricting eligibility require-
ments and lowering benefits levels by law, can entitlement expenditures be "con-
trolled."
This is exactly what the 1982 and 1983 budgets do. For example, in fiscal
1982, the administration saved $1.2 million in AFDC expenditures by denying eli-
gibility to 408,000 families and leaving 279,000 with less aid (Donnelly, 1981;
Weinraub, 1981). By lowering the Food Stamp income limit for a family of four,
one million people lost their benefits. Another 145,000 people living in boarding
houses and some 25,000 households with a member on strike also became ineligible
for the food stamp subsidy (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981a). Other programs
were similarly restructured. Even the popular Social Security program lost its
$122 minimum benefit plan for new beneficiaries.
The 1983 budget contains still other proposals for structural changes such as
reducing if not eliminating the Social Security cost of living adjustment (Donnelly,
1982a) and the replacing some Medicare and housing aid subsidies with vouchers which
assist recipients to purchase private health care and housing in the open market
(Pear, 1982e; Reinhold, 1982).
Non-entitlement programs such as day care centers, CETA jobs, training programs,
and many community services were also cut, but in different ways. They were de-
funded or transferred from the federal government to the states (see below).
The restructuring of the social welfare system, like the tax code changes
furthers the upward redistribution of income by taking more from the poor than from
the well-to-do. Implemented, in part, to make more and cheaper capital available for
private corporate investment, the social program cuts are aimed sharply at the poor-
est of the poor and disproportionately penalize them. The CBO reports that two-
thirds of the total saving from lowered benefits in fiscal year 1983 will come from
reductions affecting households with incomes under $20,000 a year; and 60% of all
savings in federal grants to state and local governments come from programs designed
to aid low-income families. Overall, families earning less than $10,000 will lose
an average of $360 in federal benefits compared to $120 for those with income over
$80,000 (CBO, 1982b).
The domestic budget cuts both shrink and weaken the welfare state. Instituting
budget savings through statutory program changes rather than reduced appropriations,
makes the changes more secure. Cuts secured through spending reductions alone can
be reversed with additional funding at a later date, but new laws are more likely to
persist (Pear, 1981; 1982b).
The cuts also weaken the political support for social programs by further isolat
ing the poor from the working poor and the middle class. Tighter eligibility rules
deny AFDC, Food Stamps, Public Housing and Medicaid benefits primarily to the working
poor leaving only the poorest of the poor in Reagan's "safety net" (Pear 1982c;
Donnelly, 1982b). In contrast, the budget spares middle class recipients from the
deepest benefit cuts and the programs they use continue to grow while those for the
-569-
poor do not. Between 1981-1983, programs benefitting the middle class will grow
2.3% a year down from an annual real growth rate of 6.0% a year between 1973-1981.
But programs for the poor will decline by 9.3% a year, compared to a real growth
rate of 9.3% in the earlier period (Nordhaus, 1982).
Poorer, smaller in number, and with even fewer ties to the non-poor, social
welfare program recipients and the programs on which they rely risk greater stigma,
and even less popular support in budget battles yet to come.
Transfer of Federal Social Welfare Responsibility to the States. Block grant
funding, first popularized by President Nixon, restructures the social welfare sys-
tem by transferring responsibility for social welfare from the federal government to
the states. Known as "New Federalism" by supporters and a return to "states rights"
by critics, block grants give the states more control of and greater flexibility in
the use of federal funds. As such, they are compatible with conservative opposition
to big government.
Although Reagan got less than he sought, the fiscal 1982 budget consolidated
almost 60 federal grant programs into nine block grants (Herbers, 1982). Funding
was then cut more than 25% across the board. The fiscal 1983 budget proposes to
"turnback" 43 more social programs worth $30.2 billion to the states and to convert
AFDC and Food Stamps into block grants in exchange for federal responsibility for
Medicaid (Reagan 1982). The "turnback" will be supported by a "trust fund" which
transfers 28 billion dollars of federal excise taxes to the states.
The increased state autonomy these plans provide pleases state governors.
Indeed, Reagan's block grants do not earmark funds, do not require states to match
federal contributions or to use them to supplement rather than supplant local funds
(Herbers, 1982). The 1983 "trust fund," Reagan explained can be used by the states
to "preserve, lower or raise taxes." The states, he added, "can manage these pro-
grams as they see fit."
If they want to continue receiving federal grants in such
areas as transportation, education, and social services,
they can use the trust fund money to pay for the grants,
or to the extent they choose to forgo the federal grant
programs, they can use their trust fund money on their
own, for those or other purposes (Reagan, 1982).
But this autonomy is not well financed. The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental
Relations, an independent federal agency, reported that in 1982, state and local
governments will receive about 24% of their funds from Washington, down from a 1980
high of 31.7%. In one year the states fell back to 1971 levels of federal aid
2
(Herbers, 1982).
2. Federal grants to states and local government was 11.5% of their own sources of
revenues in 1955, 16.8% in 1960, 31.7% in 1980 and 29.8% in 1981 (Herbers, 1982).
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Increased state autonomy over social welfare funding combined with less federal
aid does not bode well for social welfare programs. It forces already ailing state
treasuries to choose between economic development plans attractive to business and
unpopular social programs, making the latter more vulnerable to present and future
cuts. Following the fiscal 1982 cuts, a New York Times survey of 50 states found
"no state is planning to increase spending to make up for all the federal cuts and
most are making few moves to offset the effect on the poor" (Pear, 1982a). They
simply cannot afford to.
Secondly, block grants combine previously separate programs into large single
ones, causing each program to loose its visibility. But they still must compete
with the others for declining state revenues (NASW, 1981a).
Finally, block grants and the 1983 "turnback" and "swap" proposals place admin-
istrative and fiscal responsibility for social welfare in the hands of state and
local officials who historically have been less responsive than the federal govern-
ment to the needs of minorities, women and the poor. And yet, the programs Reagan
is decentralizing are some of the very ones that state officials indicate had been
established as federal responsibilities because the states were not meeting needs
perceived by Congress (Ayres, 1981; Mott, 1981).
The record on block grants introduced in the seventies suggest a continuation
of this longstanding pattern. In April 1981 NASW reported that substate allocations
for funds under Title XX social service block grants gave rural areas, blacks and
poverty populations less than their proportionate share of these service dollars (NASW
1981b).
This is not surprising. It is no secret that during the post-war period, labor
unions, civil rights, women's liberation, consumer advocacy and liberal reform groups
received a better reception at the White House than at the State House. Neither is
it surprising then that Reaganomics limits their ability to make and secure demands
costly to business and government, and makes it more difficult for them to mobilize
opposition to proposals for new and deeper social welfare cuts.
Weakening the Economic Security and Political Power of Women, minorities and
Organized Labor. Reaganomics involves domestic spending cuts, but also deregulation
of business, the workplace and the environment. The Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (EEOC), the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), Con-
sumer and Environmental Protection and other agencies are losing funds, staff and
enforcement powers. Major civil rights laws are being challenged. The combined im-
pact of the domestic budget cuts and this "deregulation" is to weaken programs and
protections fought for and won by organized labor, civil rights, womenis liberation
and liberal reform groups since the 1930's.
Social welfare programs and government regulations protect workers and the poor
against the risks, danger and inequities of living and working in a capitalist eco-
nomy and provide a minimal level of economic security. Perhaps more significantly,
the fight for these protections over the years was empowering. It strengthened a
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sense of entitlement, increased the resolve to secure a growing share of what seemed
to be an ever expanding pie, and contributed to the formation of trade unions, civil
rights and women's liberation organizations. The groups pressured for a larger share
of available resources and politicized the process of income distribution carried out
through government tax and spending program and trade union collective bargaining.
As long as the economy grew and prospered, it was not difficult to accommodate
the claims of all classes, and the social welfare programs helped assure social peace.
But since the economic crisis surfaced in the mid-1970's, demands for a rising stand-
ard of living by empowered groups 41ave become too costly to both business and govern-
ment. Today social welfare programs, government regulations and their politicized
constituencies are all under attack (Weisskopf, 1981).
The victims are disproportionately female and minorities. The assault on the
social welfare programs, the majority of whose beneficiaries are women, furthers the
"feminization of poverty," already identified by the National Council on Equal Oppor-
tunities as a disastrous national trend (National Advisory Council on Economic Oppor-
tunity, 1981). The loss of jobs and services such as day care, abortion, family plan-
ning, among many other health and social services; the relaxation of anti-discrimina-
tion and affirmative action programs; and the shrinking of the public sector, for wo-
men, means more poverty, fewer jobs and greater household responsibility (Abramovitz,
1982).
Reaganomics strikes deeply at the institutions that support the economic secur-
ity and independence of women. It is "sending women from the paid labor market back
to unpaid labor in the home" and attacking the women's movement which has challenged
the patriarchial values and institutions designed to keep women "in their place"
(Abramovitz, 1982).
Likewise, Reaganomics is lowering the standard of living for minorities. The
recipients of programs spared by Reagan's first round of budget cuts were predominant-
ly white. Only 8 percent of Americans receiving Social Security, 9 percent of those
on Medicare and 9 percent receiving Veterans Benefits are black. In contrast, blacks
who comprise 12 percent of all Americans, make up one-third of those on Food-Stamps,
Medicaid and living in public housing and almost one half of all AFDC recipients.
These programs were not considered part of the "safety net" and all were cut sharply
in the fiscal 1982 budget and the one proposed for fiscal 1983 (Rosenbaum, 1981b).
This assault on the already low standard of living of minorities combined with
relaxed enforcement of civil rights laws, and affirmative action programs, not only
reverses gains won during the Civil Rights movement, but places civil rights groups
on the defensive where they are less able to protect their constituencies.
Reaganomics also undermines the power of organized labor, With their standard
of living threatened by repeated recessions and record unemployment rates, workers
today are especially vulnerable to the threat of unemployment. Their economic in-
security is only increased by social welfare cuts, the loss of extended Unemployment
Compensation and the Trade Re-adjustment Allowance, restricted eligibility to Food
Stamps and its denial to families on strike. Greater unemployment and fewer social
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welfare benefits makes joblessness a more effective mechanism of employer control
over labor and weakens the bargaining strength of unions (Weisskopf, 1981; Saffire,
1982).
Reagan's hard-line approach to the air traffic controllers strike was widely
interpreted as administration support for contract concessions by trade unions
(Serrin, 1981). Since then, contract negotiations in the automobile, rubber, steel,
airline, trucking and printing industries have included unprecedented wage cuts,
freezes and other "takebacks" sometimes exchanged for promises of greater job security
(Raskin, 1982). Some view labor's concessions as a turning point in labor-manage-
ment cooperation, but others, including the Conference Board, a business research
group, see them as a "fundamental shift in power to employers from unions"(Serrin,
1982).
Weakening the opposition then, is a third way in which Reaganomics increases
the vulnerability of domestic programs, making them more difficult to defend against
future cuts.
REAGANOMICS AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
To fully understand and effectively resist the conservative assault on the
welfare state, it is important to see that it is part of a broader attempt to deal
with the economic crisis facing the United States since the mid-1970's (Weisskopf,
1981; Campen, 1981). As the discussion of supply-side economics shows, the conser-
vative response to this crisis consists of strategies to redirect larger amounts of
capital into the private sector. They include domestic policies that (a) redistri-
bute income from the poor and middle classes to wealthy individuals and large corpor-
ations, and (b) curb the political strength of organized labor, minorities and women.
As has been shown Reagan's tax and spending policies redistribute income upward
and reduce the share of the national product going to the poor and working class.
Combined they promise to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. Commenting on
Reaganomics, James Tobin recently wrote:
Here as in other democracies, governments have sought to
arrest the momentum of inequality by free public education,
social insurance, 'War on poverty' measures, and progress-
ive taxation. The U.S. tax and budget legislation of 1981
is an historical reversal of this direction. The message
is clear enough: Inequality of opportunity is no longer a
concern of the federal government (Tobin, 1981).
Since the administration is asking organized labor, minorities and women to
bear the brunt of its economic recovery program, it must try to forestall resistance
and to delegitimize their demand for an improved standard of living. This helps ex-
plain the Administration's hard line toward these groups.
So does the need for public acceptance of austerity (such as wage concessions,
small raises, and a generally lower standard of living). Recommending austerity as
a way to cope with the wider economic crisis is not unique to Reaganomics. It is im-
plied in the"small is beautiful" and "planned shrinkage" arguments heard a few years
ago and explicitly called for by Felix Rohatyn, a financier whom Stockman described
as a "Democrat with a program that could make the loyal opposition seem thoughtful"
(Newsweek, 1981a). Still head of New York City's Municipal Assistance Corporation,
Rohatyn recommends that the austerity measures used to contain New York City's fiscal
crisis (e.g., payroll cuts, wage restraints, and searches for new capital) be applied
to the economic crisis of the nation (Rohatyn, 1978, 1982). To implement this pro-
gram, it becomes necessary to curb the political power of those most likely to suf-
fer its consequences and resist.
Especially since a basis for resistance exists. Despite the damage Reaganomics
is producing in the welfare state and despite the increased vulnerability of domestic
programs to future assaults, social benefits are widely viewed as an "entitlement,"
if not a true right. The tension between the conservative assault on the welfare
state and popular expectations regarding entitlements can result in opposition to
Reaganomics as well as to the next attempt to resolve the continuing economic crisis
which may be less overtly conservative than Reaganomics but not necessarily less
austere.
The implications of Reaganomics for social service workers should be clear. Our
fate, like it or not, is still intimately tied to what happens to the poor and working
classes. Like our clients, we are vulnerable to isolation and attack in a period of
reaction such as this. Like our clients we are faced with hard choices ahead. For to
cooperate with Reaganomics is to subscribe to an upward redistribution of income and
to discourage the empowerment of our clients and ourselves. Since this violates our
professions' commitment to self-determination and social justice, the most effective
professional response to Reaganomics is to organize against it, as many have begun to
do.
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